Writing Sample

Writing Sample: An Abbreviated Chapter from Dissertation.

Overview and Background of the Study

Within a framework of supply side drug eradication programs.

Jamaica is nothing if not a place of contradictions. One could accurately describe the Caribbean nation as an island paradise, full of hard-working, friendly people whose contributions to world music, and religion and culture belies their tiny population. At the same time, you could say that Jamaica is one of the most dangerous countries in the Western hemisphere—beset by crushing poverty, a moribund economy and a political system riddled with corruption—and be just as accurate. The fact of the matter is that Jamaica simply cannot be reduced to a twenty-second tourism commercial with smiling natives chopping coconuts as “One Love” plays in the background. Moreover, Jamaica is not the island hellhole full of stoned gunmen and bullet-riddled shantytowns seen in the average direct to DVD gangster flick or episodes of Locked Up Abroad.1

As Rodney Walter’s quotation underscores, the case of Jamaica documents the key role that transnational criminal organizations play in the ability of a small country to govern itself effectively. It also documents the key role played by transnational relations– the permeability of state borders and the impact of non-state actors—under conditions of heightening globalization. This relationship between transnational non-state actors and the state has been a hallmark of life in the Caribbean for centuries. Moreover, in the first decades of the 21st century prove critical issues of governance in small states. The study of Jamaica’s struggle, therefore, has broader relevance to transnational crime and global government.

Jamaica is the third largest island in the Caribbean with an area of 4,244 sq. miles. Spanning 146 miles from East to West, it is home to 2.69 million people of diverse ethnic origins (Statistical Insitute of Jamaica, 2011). Like other Caribbean islands, Jamaica boasts a year round tropical climate, beautiful beaches, and its proximity to the United States (U.S.). Its geography makes it well placed on one of the world’s major shipping and airline routes. However, by sheer location the Caribbean island also find itself in the path of a multi-billion dollar trade in illegal drugs.

The very features that make the location of the region ideal for tourism simultaneously provide international traffickers with easy access to markets with a high demand for illicit drugs, “ample networks of airlines and cruise connections, and a large and mobile volume of tourists” (Ishmael, 1996). In addition, the region’s vulnerability to the drug industry has been compounded further by the challenges that Small Island Developing states (SIDS) face in an increasingly interconnected world.

 1 Walter, Rodney. “The Abundance of Water: Sizzla Interview.” Cool’Eh Magazine (14).

Despite being ranked as an upper middle-income developing country, Jamaica like other Small Island Developing states constantly struggles to alleviate poverty, manage its large debt burden, and curb its high levels of corruption. These struggles have worked to the advantage of traffickers as they demonstrate free reign of inadequately patrolled borders, coastlines, and waters, and even specific locations within these island states (Seelke, Wyler, Beittel, & Sullivan, 2011, p. 2). Among its fellow Caribbean neighbors, Jamaica looms large in the drug industry. It is the Caribbean’s largest producer and exporter of cannabis, as well as one of four major drug transit countries in the Caribbean- including Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas- that transship South American cocaine bound for the United States (U.S.), Canadian, and European markets (Sullivan, 2010). Collectively, these four countries including Cuba and Puerto Rico [identified as a minor drug transit point] constitute almost ninety per cent of the Caribbean region’s entire landmass. Not only do these countries makeup the larger islands of the region but like Jamaica they are also situated close to North America and are ideally connected to the Yucatan Channel, the Florida Straits, and the Caribbean Sea; making them accessible to global trade and markets and more importantly to illicit global activities.

Within this framework of illicit trade, there has historically been two prized drug transshipment zones; located within both the Latin America and Caribbean regions. Theses are, the Central America-Mexico Corridor, and the Caribbean–South Florida Corridor. Beginning in the mid 1970’s through the early 1990’s the Caribbean-South Florida Corridor was bestowed the title of the primary corridor for drug trafficking to the U.S. and Europe.2 The heydays of Miami’s “cocaine wars” and infamous drug cartels headed by charismatic “cocaine cowboys” like Griselda Blanco in the 80s, and Pablo Escobar in the 90s, serve as a clear point of reference for the success of this trade corridor in transporting illegal goods. Playing a critical albeit a relatively smaller role in the Colombia-Miami cocaine industry Jamaican gangs such as the Shower Posse became the foot soldiers and enforcers on the ground in Miami, protecting and overseeing local distribution as well as opening up Jamaica as a transshipment point for cocaine and later heroin.

Stemming the tide: What began for small-scale farmers in Jamaica during the 1960s as a viable answer to their economic woes- cannabis as a lucrative export crop- rapidly became the drug of choice for an emerging group of local entrepreneurial drug traffickers during the 1970s. Since the 1970s, Jamaica has been identified as a major producer and distributor of cannabis. The country continues to be seen in this light today. Jamaica’s title of major producer and distributor of cannabis has been fueled further by a growing access to other established illegal markets for cocaine and illegal weapons within the region, as well as by the growing demands for illegal drugs in foreign markets such as the United States. Large-scale eradication programs such as Operation Buccaneer, spearheaded by America’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 1974 managed to intercept numerous cannabis, cocaine, and gun shipments, as well as destroy massive cannabis production farms. With multiple

 2 See (Fieser, 2010). The Caribbean is still an active corridor, although it is not the primary corridor at this time. A Primary transit country for this region is the Bahamas, which serves as the main transit country for both Jamaican Marijuana and South American cocaine. Also, see (Seelke, Wyler, Beittel, & Sullivan, 2011).

installments of Operation Buccaneer, lasting through the 1990’s the program ultimately constrained the efforts of drug traffickers and producers in Jamaica (Le Pichon, et al., 2011).3

Determined to control and to shutdown the rapidly growing and increasingly lucrative drug trade the United States began a series of massive antidrug assistance programs in the mid-1970s geared towards halting the production of illegal products, as well as combatting drug trafficking at the source. With large-scale pressure and attention focused on the Caribbean-South Florida Corridor, the re-routing of illegal goods through the Central America-Mexico corridor began to gain traction in the early 1990s. Notwithstanding efforts to eradicate the flow of drugs, it failed. The major outcome of the antinarcotic program simply shifted to other major centers of production and distribution in the region. America’s successes in its collaborative supply side approach to crippling the distribution of drugs to its shores resulted in the creation of other major export corridors. By the 1990s, America’s West Coast began to fall prey to the ballooning in shipment and distribution of drugs redirected from the Caribbean through Mexico and Central America.

Once again, heavily focused supply side drug eradication plans were implemented starting with the Andean Counterdrug Initiative launched in 1998, Plan Colombia in 2000, and the Merida Initiative [Plan Mexico] in 2008. Learning from previous experiences in the Caribbean region the United States intensified its efforts to stamp out the drug trade. The massive Andean counterdrug program while focusing on the production and distribution of illegal drugs also attempts to counter the drug trade by focusing on economic and social development (Veillette, 2006; Estefan, 2009). On the one hand, Operation Buccaneer had focused primarily on providing the Jamaican state and its defense forces with the financial resources, the training, and the equipment needed to win the war on drugs (Leckie, 2006). On the other, the Andean counterdrug initiative and the other programs that followed it sought to accentuate and approach the problem with a specific focus on alternative crop development and democratic institution building (Veillette, 2006). The Plan, where applicable, also targeted combating transnational organized crime and money laundering (United States Government Accountability Office, 2010).

With America’s focus on Mexico, the Andean region, and Colombia, as well as the balloon effect4 of drug eradication programs, the Caribbean region is projected to become the primary transit corridor for drug trafficking once more (Jessop, 2012). In anticipation of this shift the Obama Administration 2009 has renewed American interest in the Caribbean region by implemented a new successor program to the Mérida Initiative called the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The successor program is designed specifically for equipment and training to combat drug trafficking and illegal weapons trafficking in the region. Moving beyond seeking the alleviation of drug and gunrunning, the CBSI also includes the protection of borders, the reduction of habitual relapses in crime, the elimination of gangs, and the curbing of terrorism (Holder, 2010).

 3 “Jamaica is a case in point. Estimates of the cocaine flow through Jamaica dropped from 11% of the US supply in 2000 to 2% in 2005 and 1% in 2007. This is reflected in declining seizures in Jamaican and declining arrests and convictions of Jamaican drug traffickers in the United States” (p 53).

4 (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994) “It is likely that one country’s success in reducing production will simply be another’s problem as traffickers, refiners and intermediaries migrate to places of least resistance and most opportunity, creating a demand for drug crop production. This phenomenon is referred to as the ‘balloon effect’: what is pushed down in one place simply springs up in another.”

The United State security approach for the region is tied strongly to its development assistance plan with the developing world. Any Caribbean country that receives funding from any of America’s anti drug assistance programs and that does not comply with its requirements will automatically jeopardize their economic and military assistance from the U.S., as well as from multilateral development banks (Grayson, 2010). More importantly, the brief assessment of the supply side drug eradication programs of the United States, in collaboration with developing countries such as Jamaica reveal first that the ballooning effect of illicit markets is tied to the fluidly connected and temporary formed alliances made by non- state actors in the global realm. Second, it highlights how illegal global interactions have strengthened the power base of non-state actors by allowing them to work around government policy programs intent on stopping them. It is significant that actions of non-state actors in the global drug industry have directly influenced the policymaking process and the strategies taken by the government of these countries as they constantly try to alter their policies for increased effectiveness.

The Problem of Supply From Within: For the Jamaican government, the resurgence of the drug trafficking back into the Caribbean proves especially worrisome when considering how criminal actors hinder the ability of the government to effective govern and protect its citizens within an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world. Despite the fact that Latin America is currently the primary trade corridor, Jamaica has managed to maintain its position as one of the major drug transit countries in the Caribbean region. Further like other countries in Latin American and the Caribbean region, Jamaica has very high crime rates that are tied to violence associated specifically with drug trafficking (Fajnzylber, Lederman, & Loayza, 1998; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank, 2007; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank, 2007; Shifter, 2007).







Figure 1. The Greater Kingston Area (KMA)

The Greater Kingston Area [metropolitan Area] spans 175.89 square miles and geographically is comprised of both the parishes of Kingston and St. Andrew under the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation Act of 1923.

The country’s crime rates consistently are ranked as among the highest in the world, “surpassing even war torn areas like Iraq and Afghanistan and ranked with countries with notorious crime problems such as South Africa and Colombia” (Private Sector Organization of Jamaica, 2011). The majority of Jamaica’s crime and violence has historically centered on criminal elements that reside within low-income inner city communities within the capital’s metropolitan area known as garrisons.

Table 1 Population of Urban/Rural Distribution 2011

Population by Urban/Rural Distribution 2011
Parish Number Percentage
Jamaica Total 2,697,983 100.0
Urban 1,453,438 53.9
Rural 1,244,545 46.1
Kingston Total 89,057 100.0
Urban 89,057 100.0
St. Andrew Total 573,369 100.0
Urban 495,771 86.5
Rural 77,598 13.5

Note. Adapted from table 1.4 of Census of Population & Housing-Jamaica (Statistical Insitute of Jamaica, 2011)

Geographically spanning 175.89 square miles, the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) is comprised of both the parishes of Kingston and Saint Andrew and is home to approximately 25% of the Jamaican population. Further, the KMA makes up 40% of the country’s 53.9% urban population and according to Charles & Beckford (2012), is divided into twelve garrison constituencies each comprising of several garrison communities.5 Collectively these garrison constituencies account for 60% of all identified garrison constituencies in Jamaica.6

5 “The garrison constituencies are Western St Andrew, East Central St. Andrew, South Eastern St. Andrew, Eastern Kingston, Central St. Catherine, South Central St. Catherine, Central Clarendon, West Central St. Andrew, Southern St. Andrew, South Western St. Andrew, Central Kingston, and Western Kingston” (pg. 7). * Although Charles identifies 12 garrison constituencies located within the KMA, in actuality three constituencies [Central St Catherine, South Central St. Catherine, Central Clarendon] are located outside of the KMA boundaries.

6 In addition to the 12 garrison constituencies identified by C.A.D Charles (2012), (Luton, 2010) highlights the creation of three new constituencies across the Island resulting from the 2007 general elections increased the number of political constituencies from 60 to 63. These three new constituencies are East Central St. Catherine, South East St. Catherine, and Central St. James

Since the 1990’s, the crime rate has been tied to violence associated specifically with drug trafficking while before the 1990’s violence was identified with the way in which politics in the country has developed. A pattern of communal voting within low-income communities known as garrison communities in Jamaica has resulted in political tribalism in exchange for spoils along two narrowly distinct political parties (Figueroa, Harriott, & Satchell, 2008; Sives, 2010). Working within the scope of the state, rather than attempting to overthrow the government garrison communities’ have fueled violence via turf wars and staunch political support. The use of violence and the holding of illegal weapons to protect these communities from opposing communities have further reinforced the need and use of high levels of violence (Gray, 2004). A closer look at the country’s crime rates also reveals that Jamaica has one of the world’s highest murder rates with approximately half of the murders in 2009 identified as gang related (Amnesty International, 2009; Jamaica Has Record Number of Murders in 2009, 2010).





Figure 2. Breakdown of Murders in Jamaica by Weapons & Category

Taken from ( JCF Statistical and Data Management Unit, 2011)

Fast-forward to 2011, two years later despite a massive and successful national security force infiltration of one of Jamaica’s most notorious garrisons in 2010, the murder rate in 2011 quickly reaffirmed the resilience of Jamaican gangs. Reports in 2011 by the Jamaica Constabulary Forces now reveal that gang related activities accounted for 57% of the murder rate with 69.9% of Murders being gun related ( JCF Statistical and Data Management Unit, 2011).

The formalized role of the garrisons within the political system has allowed for the normalization of high levels of crime by Jamaican citizens. It has also allowed for a growing level of tolerance for accepting some corrupt and criminal acts as the normal way of doing things (Harriott, 2004). Within the garrisons, the older roles of party mobilizers, disrupters of oppositional party events, and of perpetrators of voting fraud, have been complimented by the new roles of providing residents with community policing, punishing criminal offenders within the communities, and with providing protection services for the communities criminal activities.

The influx of crime and violence is attributed to Jamaica’s role in drug trafficking. Armed with guns and territory devoid of state control, garrison communities, in addition to their formalized role within the political system, have been able to reduce their dependence on the state by supplementing the role of the state with an involvement in criminal activities. The exportation of cannabis and the trading of cannabis for cocaine, cash, and arms have resulted in a dramatic upsurge of crime. Illegal drugs are sold and are processed in local markets, and distribution channels are maintained through the corruption of officials, law enforcement, and civil servants. There is also the growth of secondary illicit industries, such as the explosion of smaller subsidiary gangs or corner gangs, car jacking’s, contract killings, extortion, kidnappings, human trafficking, and prostitution (Chatt-A-Box, 2012; United States Department of State, 2011).7 More recently, criminal activity in Jamaica has extended to financial fraud including ponzi schemes and lottery fraud indicating a turn to more clearly identified transnational forms of criminal activities. The need for increased protection of the legal and criminal property of the garrison leaders has also resulted in the increased use of firearms and force and the laundering of drug money that has led to the fusion of legitimate and criminal economic activities and industries (United States Department of State, 2011).

Identifying the Garrison

The drastically changing social, economic, and political conditions of the state constantly affect the survival, growth, development, and response of disenfranchised segments of the population. As is commonly found in the developing world, these segments of society have developed and established permanent communities or slums whether legally or illegally by occupying vacant land owned by either the state or a private entity (Figueroa & Sivas, 2002). These area slums are characterized by low education, limited access to education, poor nutrition, high infant mortality rates, and low life expectancy.8

Further, in the case of Jamaica these communities over time have constructed and reinforced territorially distinct political divisions called garrisons. More precisely, in an attempt to manage the growing segment of the population and to assuage their high levels of dependence the Jamaican government has reinforced clientelistic practices that tie specific garrison communities to either of the two main political parties.9 As Carl Stone points out in his research on democracy and clientelism, “a garrison as the name suggests is a veritable fortress where the dominant party and/or its local agents/supporters are able to exercise control over all significant political, economic, and community related social activities” (as cited in Figueroa, 1985, p. 83). Best understood as a territorially defined politicized segment of society a garrison consists of the hard to employ, the long-term unemployed, and the working poor.

Eventually, the timing and duration of political spoils diminish and drug trafficking became a practical means of supplementing the vacuum that resulted from deficient political spoils. In some cases, drug trafficking became a more powerful means; it provided criminal entities with a viable way to provide revenue for political campaigning. Naturally, there was a gradual shift in power with the government losing advantage and the garrison gaining. Garrison leaders were able to create their own revenue and provide directly for the community; now they are able to provide the state with not just votes but also with political funding and the resource needed to keep the garrisons empowered – drugs and guns.

 7 While there is little hard evidence in terms of statistics to highlight these trends, it is common knowledge in Jamaica that for the right price members within corner gangs in garrison areas are willing to carry out killings. This is also the case for kidnappings, and human trafficking. Jamaica currently is ranked in tier two in the world in the Trafficking in Persons Report, and is listed among the main trans-shipment ports for the trade.

 8 Most importantly, in addition to these socio-economic characteristics these communities possess a distinct concept of identity, security, and legal and political rights that are different from that of the wider society and from that of the state. These identities are continuously reinforced and modified over time in response to socio- economic crisis, and entail political implications at both the domestic and international level.

9 The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP)

Today, garrisons are comprised of the politically displaced, the poor, as well as legal and criminal entities. The removal of the state from these areas has provided criminal entities not only with a space in which to operate, but it has also fostered an increasing demand for illegal goods and activities. Developing competing governance structures to the local government, garrisons play an increasing role in determining the role of political behavior and the legitimacy of the state

Analysis of Existing Garrison Literature

Political science research on Jamaica has primarily focused on three main themes. First, there is a focus on both the redesigning and strengthening of the effectiveness of social and political institutions (Munroe 1999, 2000; Ryan 1999). Second, there is a focus on revealing how alienated segments of society have constructed “exilic social spaces” (Gray, 2003) in opposition to Jamaican state ideology (Gray, 2004; Meeks, 2000; 2007; Bogues, 2002; Thomas, 2004). Aligning with this current study, a third and overlapping theme centers on notions of governance and the complex relations that exist between the Jamaican state and garrisons.

A more narrowly focused analysis of garrisons can be divided further into three main categories. The first and most popular explanations of the garrison have focused on the notion of garrisons as partisan political centers of violence, and they revolve around patterns of voting, and the formation of political communal identities. Second, other explanations focused on various political-cultural aspects of the garrison. These illustrate the growth and development of the garrisons and the relationship between the formations of political identity in relation to other communal and individual identities within the state. The focus here is on the garrison identity as a product of the culture of electoral politics. It is within this context of the garrison as a normal part of the state structure that the third set of discussions of the garrisons as centers of criminal activities, crime and electoral manipulation take place.

Identifying the Garrison from a transnational scale.

It is hard to believe that just a handful of criminal elements residing within such small territorial spaces inside Jamaica’s borders could essentially be responsible for the country’s consistently high crime rates, involvement in the drug industry, and negative image in the global realm. Dense forests and dangerous mountain terrains neither surround garrison communities nor are they characterized by permanent impenetrable walls. Yet, although located mainly in squatter zones and government housed inner city areas, these communities still manage to create and maintain well protected territories devoid of state control and that are conducive to criminal activity.

Garrisons have become institutional power structures (Figuera, Harriott, and Satchell, 2008; Sives, 2010; Gray, 2004; Headley, 1996; Stone, 1983; Figuera and Sives, 2002). What is less clear, and the basis for my dissertation, is how these criminal entities have been able to strengthen their power bases in relation to the Jamaican state- offsetting the state’s monopoly on power. In the context of this research, garrisons are defined as primarily politicized and territorially defined communities that are comprised of gangs and impoverished individuals.

What is missing from previous research on garrisons is a study of the garrison’s transnational nature. Applying Nye and Keohane’s (1971) understanding of transnational relations as, “contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by [the state]” (p. 331) to an analysis of Jamaican garrisons, the dissertation asserts that the Jamaican case reveals that the interactions between garrisons and the Jamaican state have become more transnational over time.

Shaped by territorial constraints, the nature of domestic politics, and advances in science and technology, criminal entities within garrison communities–to varying degrees–have played a direct role in shaping the behavior and policy goals of the Jamaican state. As a result, the relative power between the garrison and the state is offset. The transnational interactions between the Jamaican state and garrisons have consistently influenced the evolution/creation of new issues and processes. These over time have shifted the state’s response. Ongoing events illustrate how state-garrison interactions have framed policy responses to criminal gangs, drugs, and arms eradication campaigns and programs.

First, the existing literature assumes that the globalizing forces driving the evolution of criminal groups in Jamaica has removed or significantly weakened the political identity of the criminal elements within the garrisons. Previous scholarship [introduced above] sees criminal groups and networks as primarily forged along economic relationships facilitated by globalization. That once overt and prominent political party identity that was authenticated within garrisons in the 1940s and consolidated in the 1960s has more recently been reduced to political relationships that are little more than leverage points for criminal activities to take place. However, although the most important elements of transnational entities are their social and economic characteristics, this does not mean that the transnational activities carried out are without significant political consequences. Inadequate attention has been focused on how criminal elements utilize transnational activities to alter the underlying interests of the Jamaican state. Consequently, policy choices have been modified in light of an assessment of the cost of the state action. The continuing power of the garrison to affect important Jamaica public decision/state decision-making means that the garrison still maintains significant political identity.

The earlier formalized role of the garrison within the political system during the 1960s, has also managed to preserve, yet redirect some elements of the political identity of the garrison through what Nye and Keohane (1971) refer to as, “societal interdependence.” While the primary goals of garrison leaders and the Jamaican state may change the established interdependence between the Jamaican state and garrisons consistently allows for shifts in the nature of the interdependence, over time. The persistent dependence on the state allows garrisons to retain and to redefine aspects of its political identity. In the 1960s, political enforcers in the garrison were responsible for ensuring votes, organizing garrison constituencies, distributing political favors, and enforcing party loyalty (Moser & Holland, 1997) in exchange for first dibs on jobs and housing from the state. By the 1980s, the political enforcer is replaced by the criminal don. The enforcer became a chameleon trading his prominent political presence in the political party system for the shadows of the garrison. Finding a more lucrative and consistent means of providing for his garrison via the drug industry the don became less dependent on political parties for seasonal jobs and the social development of the community. ‘Societal interdependence’ shifted to garrisons dependent on the state for access to arms and corruptible elements of the state. In return, the state did not always override the interests of the garrisons in return for community votes, party loyalty, and because garrisons were now providing social services to communities that, a newly transformed new neoliberal state could no longer manage. Despite shifting interests, “societal interdependence” ensures the continued relevance of the political identity of the garrison, and indicates that in order to function effectively garrisons must strike bargains with the Jamaican state.

Second, the works of scholars such as Harriott (2008) and Gunst (2003) while emphasizing the expansion of transnational criminal activity on economic expansion of Jamaican gangs in the United States, Britain, and Canada, maintain an implicit understanding that these entities only become transnational once they leave their country of origin. The current study illustrates how Jamaica’s garrisons directly participate in transnational criminal activities without leaving their neighborhoods, or without maintaining branches outside of Jamaica. The study also illustrates how institutionalized transnational activities permeate Jamaica’s boundaries to such a degree that local criminal groups become a seamless part of globalization. Transnational activities raise huge difficulties for governance at the local level. Central to the current study is the idea that purely domestic entities can participate in transnational interactions. Criminal entities residing within garrison communities can and do carry out transnational activities without leaving their localities, or without maintaining branches outside of Jamaica. In order for garrison communities to conduct ‘transnational’ interactions across state boundaries they must assume a geocentric attitude- think global, act local. 10 Criminal entities residing within garrisons have managed to increase their relative power vis a vis the Jamaican state, by moving beyond geographical barriers and focusing criminal activities and behavior on the basis of the success of international criminal activities. Analysis in the dissertation further shows that there has been a general shift from aspirations of a top down decision-making and centralized management style among the criminal entities in the garrisons, towards varying degrees of decentralized and transnational management and decision-making.

More importantly, a shift in perspective firmly recognizes that although garrisons take on a geocentric attitude and apply geocentric approaches they do not become fully geocentric entities. That is, little data indicate that any specific garrison within Jamaica has severed or lost all ties to the Jamaican state. While garrisons may take on varying degrees of geocentric patterns of behavior- simultaneously using global interactions of communication, transportation finance and travel to conduct business- there is no example of a garrison that has bestowed leadership on any individual who is not first a Jamaican and second, someone who is does not reside within Jamaica.

By examining the relationship that exists between the Jamaican state and garrison communities, the dissertation asserts that a case study of Jamaica allows for an exploration of how:


1) Governments of developing countries simultaneously faced with global, international and local pressures have at times institutionalized criminal power structures by trading votes for favors within criminal communities.

 10 (Nye & Keohane, 1971)“These organizations are transnational by our definition, but they are not ‘geocentric.’ An organization becomes geocentric only when the composition of its leadership and its pattern of behavior indicate that it has lost all special ties to one or two particular states. Intergovernmental organizations often devote considerable effort to assuring that they will be geocentric in fact as well as in name: One need only note the continuing attempts by less developed states in the United Nations to assure ‘equitable’ geographical distribution of positions in the secretariat. Transnational organizations, by contrast, are rarely established as such but usually evolve gradually from national organizations. Furthermore, they frequently do not have autonomous constituent units-such as the states in intergovernmental organizations-to insist on geocentricity. Thus, transnational organizations tend to become geocentric gradually and quite frequently move in that direction only after pressure has been brought from outside, particularly by host governments.” (Introduction)

2) Second, that criminal entities through heightened conditions of globalization have been able to challenge the legitimacy of the state in key communities over time:

 a) By taking advantage of clientelistic relationships with the state,

 b) Using violence and corruption to restrict community access and to maintain spaces of illegal activity,

 c) Wielding power by utilizing access to global markets to garner community loyalty and control and, by

 d) Forming organizational structures within localities that simultaneously work with [community organizations] and against the state [gangs].

 Further, through a case study on Jamaica, the current study illustrates the proclivity of globalization to blur the lines between the domestic and the foreign affairs of a country. The Jamaican state and its institutions are shaped not just by political culture but also by global forces. While political culture has helped to shape the creation of the garrison, conditions of globalization have allowed transnational criminal actors to enhance the capacity of the garrison beyond the sovereignty of the Jamaican state—thereby strengthening the power of criminal groups vis-a-vis the state. The present research highlights the permeability of state borders and the impact of local non-state actors under conditions of heightened globalization. The research also indicates that criminal based-network groupings play a key role in the ability of a Small Island Developing State such as Jamaica to govern itself effectively. Finally, the dissertation asserts that not only have garrisons become more transnational, but also that the case of Jamaica reveals a deepening of transnationalization within and across garrisons. This process is expressed in terms of the changing nature of the organizational and power structures of criminal groups, the increasing use of violence, and the growing determination of these groups to maximize profits; orchestrated through heightened transactional interactions.


Amnesty International. (2009). Public Security Reforms and Human Rights in Jamaica.


Retrieved September 5, 2013, from Amnesty International: fa9a611c9c2f/amr380012009en.pdf


Bogues, A. (2002). Politics, Nation and Post Colony: Caribbean inflictions. Small Axe , 6 (1),




Charles, C. A., & Beckford, O. (2012). The Informal Justice Sysytem in Garrison


Constituencies. Social and Economic Studies , 61 (2), 51-72.


Chatt-A-Box. (2012, September 21). Killing Fields. Retrieved September 5, 2013, from Chatt- A-Box. A conversation:

Estefan, F. (2009, January 19). Pan Colombia, Obama Style. Retrieved September 4, 2013, from Colombia Reports:

Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D., & Loayza, N. (1998). Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin


America and the World: An Empirical Assessment. World Bank Latin American and

Caribbean Studies Viewpoints .


Fieser, E. (2010, June 1). Caribbean re-emerges as a drug corridor. GlobalPost- International




Figueroa, M. (1985). An Assessment of Over Voting in Jamaican Elections. Social and


Economic Studies , 34 (3), 71-106.


Figueroa, M., & Sives, A. (2002). Homogenous Voting, Electoral Manipulation and the


‘Garrison’ Process in Post-Independence Jamaica. Commonwealth & Comparative

Politics , 40 (1), 81-108.

Figueroa, M., Harriott, A., & Satchell, N. (2008). The Political Ecnomy of Jamaica’s Inner- City Violence: A Special Case? In J. Rivke, The Caribbean City. Kingston; Miami:

Ian Randle Publishers.


Gray, O. (2004). Demeaned Empowered: The Social Power of the Urban Poor In Jamaica.


Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.


Grayson, K. (2010, June 3). Why Jamaica Proves that the ‘War on Drugs’ is Not Over.


Retrieved September 5, 2013, from Chansing Dragons: over.html


Gunst, L. (2003). Born fi’ Dead: a journey through the Jamaican posse underworld. New


York: H. Holt.


Harriott, A. (2008). Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: breaking the nexus. Jamaica:


Canoe Press.


Harriott, A. (2004). Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy.


Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.


Headley, B. D. (1996). The Jamaican Crime Scene: a perspective. Washington DC: Howard


University Press.


Holder, E. (2010). Speech by Eric Holder Attorney General, United States of America.


Washington, DC: Caribean Community (CARICOM).

Ishmael, A. O. (1996). A Caricom Position on the Drug Trade with Emphasis on the Situtation in Guyana. 19th session of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission

(CICAD). Washington, DC.


Jamaica Has Record Number of Murders in 2009. (2010, January 12). BBC Monitoring


Americas .


JCF Statistical and Data Management Unit. (2011). Jamaica Constabulary Force Periodic


Major Crime Statistics Review. Retrieved September 4, 2013, from Jamica Constabulary Force:


Jessop, D. (2012, October 12). Narco Trafficking A Growing Threat. The Gleaner.


Johnson, H. (2011). Challenges to Civil Society: Popular Protest & Governance in

Jamaica. Cambria Press.

Le Pichon, T., Pietschmann, T., Leggett, T., Johansen, R., Schmidt, A., Izadifar, D., et al. (2011, April). The Transatlantic Cocaine Market research paper. United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime.


Leckie, T. R. (2006, June 16). Enhancing the Jamaica Defence Force Military Intelligence


Unit’s Effectiveness to Conduct Counterdrug Missions. US Army Command and

General Staff College.


Luton, D. (2010, March 3). JLP Has Advantage In New Constituencies. The Gleaner .


Meeks, B. (2007). Envisioning Caribbean Futures: Jamaican Perspective. Kingston, Jamaica: Press University of the West Indies.

Meeks, B. (2000). Narrative of Resistence: Jamaica, Trinidad, the Caribbean. Kingston, Jamaica: Press University of the West Indies.

Moser, C. O., & Holland, J. (1997). Urban Poverty and Violence in Jamaica. World Bank




Munroe, T. (2000). Caribbean Thought and the Political Process. In D. Hall, & K. Benn,


Contending with Destiny: the Caribbean in the 21st Century. Kingston: Ian Randle



Munroe, T. (1999). Renewing Democracy Into the Millennium: The Jamaican Experience in


Perspective. Press University of the West Indies.


Nye, J. S., & Keohane, R. O. (1971). Transnational Relations and World Politics.


International Organization , 25 (3), 721-748.


Rodney, W. The Abundance of Water: Sizzla Interview. Cool’Eh Magazine (14).

Seelke, C. R., Wyler, L. S., Beittel, J. S., & Sullivan, M. P. (2011, May 12). Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug trafficking and the U.S. Counterdrug Programs. CRC

Report for Congress . Congressional Research Service.


Shifter, M. (2007, February 1). Latin Americ’s Drug Problem. Current History .


SIDSnet. (n.d.). Caribbean Region: Overview. Retrieved September 23, 2013, from



Sives, A. (2010). Elections, Violence and the Democratic Process in Jamaica 1944-2007.


Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.


Statistical Insitute of Jamaica. (2011). 2011 Census of Population & Housing- Jamaica.


Retrieved September 4, 2013, from Statistical Institute of Jamaica:


Stone, C. (1983). Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica. New Brunswick: Transaction


Books Publishers.


Sullivan, M. P. (2010). Jamaica: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research




The Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ). (2011). Position Paper on National


Security. PSOJ.


Thomas, D. A. (2004). Modern Blackness: nationalism, globalization, and the politics of culture in Jamaica. Durham: Duke University Press.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the


World Bank. (2007). Cime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy

Options in the Caribbean. UNODC; The World Bank.


United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. (1994, November). Ilicit Drugs: Social Impacts and Policy Responses.

United States Department of State. (2011, June 27). Trafficking in Persons Report-Jamaica.


Retrieved September 5, 2013, from


United States Government Accountability Office. (2010). Merida Initiative: The United States has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures. Washington, DC.


United States Government Accountability Office. (2010). Merida Initiative: The United States


has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance

Measures. Washington, DC.


Veillette, C. (2006, January 27). Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding


Programs FY2006 Assistance. CRS Report for Congress.


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: